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1. Introduction 
 
One of the most cited propositions in empirical finance literature is that expected risk and return 
have a positive relationship. Bowman (1980) for the first time contradicts this association by 
suggesting his famous ‘risk-return paradox’. He advances his findings by pointing out – 
“troubled companies take more risk” (Bowman, 1982). His findings were attributed to two 
factors. First of all, efficient corporate managers can increase return and reduce risk 
simultaneously. Thereby, the negative risk-return relationships occur. Second, these managers 
are not risk-averse rather they are risk-seekers. Thus, Bowman’s (1980; 1982) findings are 
critical to judge companies’ risk-attitudes as they provide the basis of the well-known ‘risk-
return paradox’. Overall, he suggests that risk-attitudes (i.e., risk-seeking or risk-averse) of the 
companies and their managers are well developed by the behavioral decision theories. It stresses 
the need and role of reference or target return level in the analysis of risky choices.  
 
One of the most known behavioral representations is the Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) 
Prospect Theory which defines utility on a profit-loss basis by stating that the overall utility of a 
‘Prospect’ is the expected utility of its ‘outcomes’.  Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) framework 
thus put the following testable hypotheses - when performance is below a given target return 
level, decision makers would be risk-seeking, and when performance is above that level, they 
would be risk-averse. It happens because high-variance (riskier) alternatives may provide a 
decision maker a better chance of achieving the desired outcome than low-variance (safer) 
alternatives. Though the Prospect Theory was initially developed at the individual decision 
maker’s level, but since the 1980’s, many scholars use it explicitly to analyze risk-return 
associations at the firm and industry levels, but mostly in the US. 
 
This study investigates the presence of the Prospect Theory and Fishburn’s (1977) measure of 
risk to explain variability of accounting measures in the CNX NIFTY companies. If variability of 
their returns is related to the extent to which they operate below target, such results would be 
consistent with the Prospect Theory and Fishburn’s measure of risk [see Equation (1)]. In this 
endeavor, this study is based on the Johnson’s (1994) framework. The contributions of this study 
are that it: 
 
1. Concentrates on the CNX NIFTY companies over the period 2009 through 2013, a period of 
significant crises and after-crises changes in the Indian industries. The reason behind selection of 
CNX NIFTY is that it covers 23 sectors of the Indian economy and offers everyone the exposure 
to the Indian markets in one portfolio. Also, during 2008-12, CNX NIFTY Index’s share of NSE 
market capitalization fell from 65% to 29% (SEBI, 2013). 
 
2. Evaluates the associations between distance from target and variability of outcomes. 
 
3. Investigates the question of an appropriate target return for the Indian companies as 
represented by the CNX NIFTY Index. and 
 
4. Examines the Prospect Theory presence in light of the risk-return paradox for Industry (13 in 
total) and Size sub groups. 
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This is also the first study on the Indian CNX NIFTY companies dealing with this topic and 
examining the behavioral implications of the Prospect Theory in terms of risk-attitudes (i.e., risk-
return associations) of them and their managers. 
 
On April 22nd, 1996, National Stock Exchange [NSE], India launched the new Equity Index ‘The 
NSE-50’ (better known as Nifty-50). CNX NIFTY is now a well diversified 50 stock Index 
accounting for 23 sectors of the economy with an aggregate market capitalization (MC) of 
around Rs.45,34,597 crores (as on March 31st, 2014) (SEBI, 2014) from Rs.1,70,000 crores. It is 
used for a variety of purposes such as benchmarking fund portfolios, index based derivatives and 
index funds.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows - following introduction in Section 1, Section 2 
introduces hypotheses and presents risk and return measurement, data descriptions, Size and 
Industry group classifications and test design. Section 3 presents the findings and required 
discussions of this study, followed by conclusion in Section 4.  
 
2. Literature Review: 
 
Cheng (2010) overcome the shortcomings of Bowman’s (1980) empirical study, as its conclusion 
cannot validate whether the result is biased due to the sampling period. The empirical findings of 
this study indicate that Chinese companies are more risk averse than Western companies to 
ensure earnings. However, Chinese companies are less sensitive than Western companies 
regarding risk-reward relationships. This is even more pronounced for well-performing Chinese 
companies based on market benchmarks, i.e., target levels or reference points. Brumagim and 
Wu (2005) conducted a questionnaire survey on Chinese companies regarding the management’s 
attitude toward risks and found that Chinese management teams show a risk preference. 
 
However, an increasing number of empirical results and theoretical arguments identified by 
Deephouse and Wiseman (2000) support Bowman’s risk-return paradox with their empirical 
research on organizational behavior. Based on a literature review, Nickel and Rodriguez (2002) 
suggested that the level of risk preference on the part of management changes along with the 
environment. The same management may be risk-averse under some circumstances and may 
show risk neutrality, or even a risk appetite, under other circumstances. LaPorta et al. (2000) also 
indicated that corporate financial decisions are subject to the influence of external environments 
(e.g. laws and regulations, legal compliances, and cultures). 
 
Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988), in one of the earliest studies take a look at this Theory at the 
organizational level and explore the relationships between an organization’s risks and return 
levels. They investigate the risk and return parameters of many industries using rate of Return on 
Equity (ROE) and variance of ROE as return and risk measures. Thus, they test Kahneman and 
Tversky’s (1979) hypotheses by using accounting data, defining benchmark returns as median 
returns, and dividing their selected companies in two groups – above and below target returns. 
Their results strongly support the above presented Prospect Theory’s implications. 
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Jegers (1991) follows Fiegenbaum and Thomas’s (1988) methodology to test some new return 
and risk variables like ROA (Return on Assets) in addition to ROE (which only reflects 
shareholders’ viewpoint), which would also take into account the managerial performance view, 
and Cash Flow on Equity (CFE), and a Coefficient of Variation (CV) (defined as the standard 
deviation of returns divided by the average return), in addition to the variance of returns. Jegers 
(1991) calculates each firm’s time average return, ranks firms according to these values and 
divides the firms into two equally sized groups - those with above and below target returns (the 
target is the median return). Then, Spearman rank correlations between risk and return and the 
negative association ratio are calculated for each group. The results corroborate with those of 
Fiegenbaum and Thomas’s (1988). Miller and Leiblein (1996) favoured five-year average ROA 
as it does not vary with changes in financial leverage, as does ROE. 
 
Finally, Johnson’s (1994) analysis of risk-attitude in banks in a behavioral finance framework is 
also based on Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988) and he uses Fishburn’s (1977) measure of risk 
defined as dispersion about the mean outcome. Johnson (1994) tests several measures of return 
and risk for a sample of US commercial banks for the 1970-1989 periods. He uses standard 
measures of return like ROA and ROE, as well as Primary Capital Ratio (PCR). Risk is 
measured as standard deviation of outcome. The study aims at examining historical data to 
determine whether there is any evidence consistent with the Prospect Theory, by measuring the 
relationship between outcome variability and distance from target. Targets are also defined as the 
median values of return variables. Banks are classified in two separate groups according to this 
target, and correlation between distance to target and standard deviations are computed. The 
statistical tests are based on Kendall’s (1938)  correlation coefficient. The obtained results also 
support Fiegenbaum and Thomas’s (1988) findings.  
 
Alam and Boon Tang (2012) showed that Islamic banks located above target risk level tend to 
show risk-averse behaviour, while banks below target risk level inclined towards risk-seeking 
attitude. Their results also highlighted that banks which have higher loans to total asset ratio tend 
to take on lower risk. Kliger and Tsur (2011) also showed that firms with returns above their 
reference levels take less risk than firms with returns below their reference levels. However, 
Miller and Leiblein (1996) contradicted the idea that poor performers take on high variance 
strategies with low expected values. Using a fundamentally different concept of risk -downside 
risk, they indicated downside risk leads to organizational strategic changes that improve, rather 
than diminish, subsequent firm performance. Also, they found firms with exceptionally high 
performance avoid downside risk in the subsequent period.  
 
Some scholars had also argued that the accuracy of accounting data or databases may influence 
the correctness of Bowman’s risk-return paradox. Davis (1996) found that if survivorship bias is 
overlooked, explanatory variables based on accounting information will be over-estimated in the 
empirical results and explanatory power. Some literature sources come from Compustat 
Database and therefore have a survivorship bias problem for data before 1978. Chou et al. (2009) 
and Kliger and Tsur (2011) sampled data to correct the bias problem from Compustat Database, 
and their findings still support Bowman’s (1980). 
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2. Research Methodology: 
 
2.1 Hypotheses: 
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) testable hypotheses imply that in a group of companies with 
above target returns, risk and return would be positively correlated, and for companies with 
below target returns, they would have negative correlations.  However, in this regard 
Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988: 90) highlight the misspecification bias implying that empirical 
analysis like this study can yield both positive and negative risk-return correlations in a situation 
that fits the Prospect Theory’s assumptions. 
 
However, the most important issue here is to identify a proper measure for the target returns 
level. Lev (1969: 290) emphasizes – “the desirability of adjusting the firm’s financial ratios to 
predetermined targets which are usually based on industry wide averages.” Frecka and Lee’s 
(1983) also support Lev’s (1969) viewpoint that companies should adjust financial ratios in a 
dynamic fashion to targets that appear to be industry-wide averages of those ratios. Kliger and 
Tsur (2011) calculated reference point annually based on past industrial performance. Jegers 
(1991) also defines the target level as the median return for the companies in an industry. So, as 
the objective of this study is to test the nature of the risk and return associations, this study uses 
the CNX NIFTY companies’ median return. 
 
Also, in line with the Prospect Theory suggestions and the results of the previous empirical 
studies, it tests the following two research hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: A negative association between risk and return exists for CNX NIFTY companies 
below target return levels (i.e., CNX NIFTY companies’ median returns).  
Hypothesis 2: A positive association between risk and return exists for CNX NIFTY companies 
above target return levels (i.e., CNX NIFTY companies’ median returns).  
 
2.2 Risk and Return Measurement: 
Fishburn (1977) further suggests that risk is not necessarily a measure of dispersion about an 
expected value, but rather a function of distance from a target outcome. He put this idea as 
follows: 
           t 
R(t) =  (t  x) dF(x)                                           Equation (1)                                    
        ∞ 
Where: 
R(t) = Measure of risk 
t = Target or aspiration level 
 = Sensitivity to deviation from target, >0 
F(t) = Probability density function of x 
So, R(t) is not a function of dispersion of a distribution about its mean, but is the likelihood of 
below-target outcomes. The positive parameter  measures companies’ attitude toward this 
below-target results. 
The decision making process in terms of risk-return of different industries is also investigated by 
many studies throughout the world. The rates of return on assets or equity (ROA/ROE) (see e.g., 
Blair and Heggestad, 1978; Hart and Jaffee, 1974; Koehn and Santomero, 1980; etc.) from the 
viewpoints of the managers and shareholders, and also Capital ratios (see e.g., Brewer and Lee, 
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1986; and International Monetary Fund, 1990) from the perspectives of regulators and financial 
markets and their practitioners receive increasing attention in this regard. It is significant to note 
that all these three measures are interrelated as follows: 
ROA = E/TA × ROE                                          Equation (2) 
Where: 
ROA = Return on Assets (net income to total assets)  
E/TA = The Equity or Capital ratio (equity to total assets)  
ROE = Return on Equity (net income to equity)  
Here, each of these is investigated as a possible target of the CNX NIFTY companies. Under this 
study, ‘return’ is measured as the average return (on assets and equity) over the study period, 
while ‘risk’ is operationalized as the standard deviation of returns over the same period. It also 
undertakes accounting data in line with past empirical studies (see e.g., Fiegenbaum and 
Thomas, 1988; Jegers, 1991; Johnson, 1994; etc.) for its investigation purpose because of its 
universal use among the managers, shareholders, regulators, competitors, etc.   
 
2.3 Data: 
This study has selected the period in between 2009-13 to avoid any significant and continual 
impact from the US sub-prime crisis which was originated in the US financial sector in July, 
2007 (Dasgupta, 2013) and caused a serious collapse in international stock markets in January, 
2008 (Gokay, 2009). However, over the crisis period as a whole (i.e., July 2007 to August 2009 
[see Goldstein and Xie, 2011]), India has had the best performance (Goldstein and Xie, 2011).  
Although there were minor hiccups during 2008-09, but the overall economic growth of India 
stood at 5.3% and 8.6% (Bajpai, 2011) during the fiscal years of 2009-10 and 2010-11 
respectively due to strong corporate performance. So, the crisis-impact on Indian corporate 
financial performance was not time-variant after the crisis.  
This study obtains its required data from the annual reports of 50 CNX NIFTY companies and 
other internet resources, which are listed in this Index of the Indian stock markets for the 
undertaken study period. For each of them, the annual rates of return on assets and equity (ROA 
and ROE) and the capital ratio (CR) are computed as follows: 
ROAin = Niin / TAin                                                         Equation (3) 
ROEin = Niin / Ein                                                            Equation (4) 
CRin = Ein / TAin                                                             Equation (5) 
Where:  
ROAin = Rate of Return on Assets for companies i in year n  
Niin = Net income for companies i in year n  
TAin = Total assets for companies i in year n  
ROEin = Rate of Return on Equity  
Ein = Equity (i.e., book value) for companies i in year n  
CRin = Capital ratio 
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2.4 Size and Industry Effects: 
 
Table 1.1: Industry breakdown of CNX NIFTY [i.e., Nifty-50] companies 
Nifty Classification Classification under this Study 
Financial Services Industry Number of companies 
Information Technology (IT) Automobiles 05 
Energy Banking & Investment 
Finance 
10 
Consumer Goods Cement 04 
Automobiles Construction & Infrastructure 03 
Pharmaceuticals FMCG & Food & Beverages 03 
Construction Information Technology (IT) 05 
Cement & Cement Products Metals 03 
Metals Mining 03 
Telecom Oil & Gas 05 
Services Paints 01 
Media & Entertainment Pharmaceuticals 04 
Industrial Manufacturing Power 03 
Telecom 01 
 
Table 1.2: Nifty-50 Companies and their Classifications  
Name of the Company Nifty Classification Classification under this Study 
ACC Cement & Cement Products Cement 
Ambuja Cements Ltd. Cement & Cement Products Cement 
Asian Paints Ltd. Consumer Goods Paints 
Axis Bank Ltd. Financial Services Banking & Investment 
Finance 
Bajaj Auto Ltd. Automobiles Automobiles 
Bank of Baroda Financial Services Banking & Investment 
Finance 
BHEL Industrial Manufacturing Construction & Infrastructure 
BPCL Energy Oil & Gas 
Bharti Airtel Ltd. Telecom Telecom 
Cairn India Ltd. Energy Oil & Gas 
Cipla Ltd. Pharmaceuticals Pharmaceuticals 
Coal India Ltd. Metals Mining 
DLF Ltd. Construction Construction & Infrastructure 
Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd. Pharmaceuticals Pharmaceuticals 
Gail (India) Ltd. Energy Oil & Gas 
Grasim Industries Ltd. Cement & Cement Products Cement 
HCL Technologies Ltd. IT IT 
HDFC Bank Ltd. Financial Services Banking & Investment 
Finance 
Hero Motocorp Automobiles Automobiles 
Hindalco Industries Ltd. Metals Metals 
AABFJ  |  Volume 11, no. 3, 2017 
 
110 
 
HUL Consumer Goods FMCG & Food & Beverages 
HDFC Financial Services Banking & Investment 
Finance 
ICICI Bank Ltd. Financial Services Banking & Investment 
Finance 
IDFC Financial Services Banking & Investment 
Finance 
ITC Ltd. Consumer Goods FMCG & Food & Beverages 
Indusind Bank Ltd. Financial Services Banking & Investment 
Finance 
Infosys Ltd. IT IT 
Jindal Steel Metals Metals 
Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. Financial Services Banking & Investment 
Finance 
L&T Ltd. Construction Construction & Infrastructure 
Lupin Ltd. Pharmaceuticals Pharmaceuticals 
M&M Ltd. Automobiles Automobiles 
Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. Automobiles Automobiles 
Mcdowell-N/United Spirits Consumer Goods FMCG & Food & Beverages 
NMDC Metals Mining 
NTPC Ltd. Energy Power 
ONGC Energy Oil & Gas 
Power Grid Corp. of India Ltd. Energy Power 
PNB Financial Services Banking & Investment 
Finance 
RIL Energy Oil & Gas 
Sesa-Sterlite Metals Mining 
SBI Financial Services Banking & Investment 
Finance 
Sun Pharmaceuticals Industries 
Ltd. 
Pharmaceuticals Pharmaceuticals 
TCS IT IT 
Tata Motors Ltd. Automobiles Automobiles 
Tata Power Ltd. Energy Power 
Tata Steel Ltd. Metals Metals 
Tech Mahindra Ltd. IT IT 
Ultratech Cement Ltd. Cement & Cement Products Cement 
Wipro IT IT 
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This study divides all the CNX NIFTY (i.e., Nifty-50) companies under 13 industries (see Table 
1.1) which represent their respective sectors1. Some industries of similar nature are combined 
together under this study for research convenience. For example, the Financial Services and 
Consumer Goods (Nifty classifications) are represented by Banking & Investment Finance and 
FMCG & Foods & Beverages respectively. Similarly, Cement & Cement Products, Energy, and 
Construction and Industrial Manufacturing (Nifty classifications) are represented by Cement, Oil 
& Gas and Power, and Construction & Infrastructure respectively under this study. This study 
has also maintained some Nifty classifications like IT, Automobiles and Pharmaceuticals while 
added new classification like Paints for study purpose. Also, some Nifty classifications like 
Media & Entertainment and Services don’t have any representative in Nifty-50 Index. Table 1.1 
provides the detailed classification data of these industries. Table 1.2 also provides the Nifty-50 
companies during the study period and their respective Nifty and Study classifications.    
 
Table 2.1: Nifty-50 Company Sizes  
(based on Average Market Capitalization [in Rs. Billions]) 
Rs.0<250 Billions Rs.250<500 Billions Rs.500<1,000 Billions ≥Rs.1,000 Billions 
33 7 4 6 
Further Division of Rs.0<250 Billions Companies (33) 
Rs.0<50 Billions Rs.50<100 
Billions 
Rs.100<150 
Billions 
Rs.150<200 
Billions 
Rs.200<250 
Billions 
0 8 8 8 9 
 
Table 2.2: Nifty-50 Company Weightages (in %) 
0%-<1% 1%-<2.5% 2.5%-<5% ≥5% 
20 19 5 6 
Note:  Above % are taken looking at the representative weightages in the broad Nifty-50 Index.  
 
Table 2.3: Nifty-50 Company Average Equity Share Capital (in Rs. Billions) 
Rs.0<2.5 Billion Rs.2.5<5 Billions Rs.5<10 Billions ≥Rs.10 Billions 
19 17 4 10 
 
Table 2.4: Size breakdown of CNX NIFTY [i.e., Nifty-50] companies 
[Based on average Total Assets in Rs. & $ Millions (2009-13)] 
Size Amount  
(in Rs. Millions) 
Amount  
(in $ 
Millions) 
Number of 
Companies 
1  0-2,50,000  0-5,000 17 
2  2,50,001-
5,00,000  
5,001-10,117 11 
3  5,00,001-
10,00,000 
10,118-
20,000 
09 
4  ≥10,00,001 ≥20,001 13 
 
Company size may also affect risk and return patterns since peer group designations can often be 
based on size. Although the Nifty-50 companies are representing the large cap companies, but 
the average market capitalization of these companies during the study period (see Table 2.1) has 
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pointed out that there are wide variations in regard to market-values of these companies. Also, 
the corresponding weightages of each of these companies in the broad Nifty-50 Index are also 
variable (see Table 2.2). This study has also considered the average equity share capital (issued 
and outstanding) during the study period (see Table 2.3).  This is especially important as the 
ROE is one of the representatives of Indian companies’ return under this study. All these 
information has evidenced that Nifty-50 companies do have size-variations and the Index is well-
represented by different sized companies. So, testing of size effect is justified under this study. 
Thereby, the CNX NIFTY companies have been assigned a ‘Size’ variable from 1 to 4 under this 
study. The basis for these assignments is the average of total assets for the period tested (see 
Johnson, 1994). Table 2.4 provides the Size breakdown of these companies. However, Horowitz 
et al. (2000) found that the influence of size effects on the risk-return relationship has been 
gradually declining since the 1980s. 
 
2.5 Test Design: 
This study relies on time average and their standard deviations measure and also their respective 
medians after the target returns level (i.e., industry’s median return) is decided. It works with 
three zones: 
 
Zone 1 – ROA, Zone 2 – ROE, and Zone 3 – CR 
It also splits the sample in two areas for each zone- Above and Below, corresponding 
respectively to companies above and below the target level, i.e., the median of the variable 
corresponding to the zone, to incorporate the Fishburn’s (1977) measure of risk. 
 
The Prospect Theory and Fishburn’s measure of risk suggest that decision makers are more 
willing to accept variability the further below target they find themselves. Thus, the standard 
deviation of outcome (i.e., returns) should be related to distance from target when decision 
makers are above or below target. It defines distance from target as follows:    
 
DTROAi = MEROAi  MEDMROA  
DTROEi = MEROEi  MEDMROE  
DTCRi = MECRi  MEDMCR  
 
Where:  
 
MEROAi, MEROEi and MECRi = Time series median ROA, ROE and CR respectively, for 
company i.  
 
It also designates the Standard deviation of outcome (i.e., returns) by the following variables - 
SDROAi, SDROEi and SDCRi. 
It uses Kendall’s (1938) test here over and above other correlation tests as because the data is 
non-normal or ordinal and as there are outliers. Kendall’s test is used to measure the correlations 
between these variables within the relevant groups (overall and Size and Industry sub groups). 
Kendall’s possible values range from +1 (perfect positive correlation) to -1 (perfect negative 
correlation). However, if Kendall’s value is consistently negative below target and positive 
above target, such results would tend to support the Fishburn’s measure of risk and the Prospect 
Theory implications. 
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3. Results and Discussions: 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
A. Mean 
 ROA ROE CR 
Overall 10.71640 21.78228 1.47120 
Size 1 16.66824 29.09059 1.54324 
Size 2 12.13182 21.03655 1.56791 
Size 3 6.56133 16.77556 1.91630 
Size 4 4.61215 16.32246 0.98702 
Automobiles 14.77600 31.67200 0.99111 
Banking & 
Investment Finance 
1.58200 16.88140 0.59527 
Cement 10.99000 17.93000 1.49865 
Construction & 
Infrastructure 
7.36000 18.28000 0.54166 
FMCG & Food & 
Beverages 
17.17333 42.44000 1.77673 
Information 
Technology (IT) 
19.13600 28.32800 1.16284 
Metals 7.25333 14.57333 0.37604 
Mining 22.91333 29.26000 3.48309 
Oil & Gas 9.08400 14.29200 2.10614 
Paints 18.32000 37.88000 2.21824 
Pharmaceuticals 12.46500 18.95000 1.30435 
Power  6.42666 11.67333 4.14648 
Telecom 9.50000 14.76000 1.90467 
B. Standard Deviation (SD) 
 ROA ROE CR 
Overall 7.85658 14.94132 1.59393 
Size 1 7.43497 22.18539 0.71726 
Size 2 7.90954 8.66573 1.37346 
Size 3 2.94491 8.02408 2.74390 
Size 4 3.88461 4.74832 1.63657 
Automobiles 8.11272 18.10613 0.87329 
Banking & 
Investment Finance 
0.56318 3.98699 0.94209 
Cement 1.19247 1.68432 1.02429 
Construction & 
Infrastructure 
2.00748 9.22524 0.38671 
FMCG & Food & 
Beverages 
10.9066 50.65556 0.75878 
Information 
Technology (IT) 
5.14389 4.82623 0.69614 
Metals 4.44235 11.72594 0.27090 
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Mining 9.93815 1.25904 3.51158 
Oil & Gas 2.93521 4.32882 1.51965 
Paints NA# NA# NA# 
Pharmaceuticals 4.80384 6.57132 0.47908 
Power  2.11625 3.66466 3.15586 
Telecom NA# NA# NA# 
C. Maximum 
 ROA ROE CR 
Overall 30.14000 98.28000 7.48339 
Size 1 30.14000 98.28000 2.76931 
Size 2 25.90000 36.08000 4.17606 
Size 3 11.58000 30.24000 7.48339 
Size 4 11.80000 22.88200 6.04805 
Automobiles 24.66000 52.20000 2.54118 
Banking & 
Investment Finance 
2.68000 22.88200 3.12185 
Cement 11.80000 19.98000 2.76931 
Construction & 
Infrastructure 
9.66000 26.22000 0.91191 
FMCG & Food & 
Beverages 
26.86000 98.28000 2.24900 
Information 
Technology (IT) 
25.90000 36.08000 2.34742 
Metals 12.38000 27.94000 0.68884 
Mining 30.14000 30.24000 7.48339 
Oil & Gas 11.80000 19.38000 4.17606 
Paints 18.32000 37.88000 2.21824 
Pharmaceuticals 17.18000 26.98000 1.89898 
Power  8.78000 14.12000 6.04805 
Telecom 9.50000 14.76000 1.90467 
D. Minimum 
 ROA ROE CR 
Overall 0.95600 0.56000 0.05438 
Size 1 5.36000 0.56000 0.46289 
Size 2 1.27000 7.46000 0.21731 
Size 3 1.63200 8.16000 0.14036 
Size 4 0.95600 6.02000 0.05438 
Automobiles 7.56000 14.92000 0.46289 
Banking & 
Investment Finance 
0.95600 9.95000 0.05438 
Cement 9.22000 15.88000 0.29075 
Construction & 
Infrastructure 
5.96000 8.16000 0.14036 
FMCG & Food & 
Beverages 
5.36000 0.56000 0.90148 
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Information 
Technology (IT) 
13.82000 24.04000 0.52145 
Metals 4.54000 6.02000 0.21731 
Mining 11.58000 27.84000 0.90899 
Oil & Gas 4.76000 8.62000 0.63367 
Paints 18.32000 37.88000 2.21824 
Pharmaceuticals 5.78000 11.46000 0.89933 
Power  4.68000 7.46000 0.50358 
Telecom 9.50000 14.76000 1.90467 
NA# Only 1 company, so can’t be calculated 
 
The descriptive statistics of the selected variables for all the CNX NIFTY [i.e., Nifty-50] 
companies are provided in Table 3. They indicate that the mean of the rate of ROA is about 
10.71640 which implies that the average net income of these companies is around 10.72% of 
their total assets. Moreover, the mean of the rate of ROE is about 21.78% (appx.), and the mean 
of the ratio of capital is about 1.47120, which shows that on average the Indian companies’ 
capital is about 1.47% of their total assets. Table 3 also shows how Size and Industry Group 
companies are contributing towards the overall results. In regard to returns (i.e., both ROA and 
ROE), Size 1 CNX NIFTY companies are the front-runners in driving the overall results of all 
such companies. However, their ROE returns are also most risky (higher SD value). But, in 
terms of ROA returns, Size 1 companies are following their Size 2 counterparts. This shows the 
normal risk-return relationships (however only in terms of ROE and not ROA) for these 
companies. In regard to both risk and returns parameter, Size 3 and 4 classified companies are 
laggards. However, in regard to the CR, it is found that Size 3 companies are more equity-heavy 
than their other counterparts. The CR is minimum (i.e., 0.99% [appx.]) for Size 4 companies 
which imply that big Indian companies are more dependent on debt capital which itself implies 
their risk-seeking attitude. This is clear from their balance sheets (source: moneycontrol.com). It 
is due to the fact that higher debt capital in the capital structure of the company implies higher 
financial risks that the companies are taking knowingly. The Industry groups’ results show that 
mining, IT, paints, FMCG & food & beverages and automobiles companies (all are showing 
above average ROA and ROE) are contributing most in overall returns of the CNX NIFTY 
companies. However, banking & investment finance, power, metals, telecom companies are not 
contributing at par with them. However, these results also indicate the positive risk-return 
relationships as higher SD values are also associated with higher returns companies. It is also 
evident that capital intensive industries like power, mining, etc. are more equity-prone than their 
metals, construction & infrastructure and banking & investment finance peers from the Nifty 
Index.            
 
Table 4: Cross-sectional median values 
 MEDMROA MEDMROE MEDMCR 
Overall 9.70000 19.21500 0.88162 
Size 1 14.20000 24.30000 1.46558 
Size 2 11.40000 19.28000 1.02106 
Size 3 5.60000 14.50000 0.58518 
Size 4 2.60000 17.17000 0.28353 
Automobiles 9.70000 31.30000 0.63527 
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Banking & 
Investment 
Finance 
1.53000 18.16000 0.16850 
Cement 10.50000 16.40000 1.42201 
Construction & 
Infrastructure 
5.60000 17.80000 0.54965 
FMCG & Food 
& Beverages 
19.30000 30.40000 2.13007 
Information 
Technology (IT) 
15.50000 24.60000 0.99060 
Metals 6.60000 12.60000 0.22564 
Mining 27.30000 33.00000 1.89720 
Oil & Gas 10.30000 15.70000 1.69194 
Paints* 18.00000 36.00000 2.07999 
Pharmaceuticals 13.40000 21.95000 1.21126 
Power 5.80000 14.10000 5.96133 
Telecom* 5.70000 12.40000 1.33718 
 
Here, MEDMROA – Overall/Sub Group Median ROA, MEDMROE – Overall/Sub Group Median ROE and 
MEDMCR – Overall/Sub Group Median CR 
 
Table 4 shows cross-sectional median values which are used as targets for all the CNX NIFTY 
companies overall and Size and Industry group companies. The cross-sectional median values 
(i.e., CNX NIFTY companies’ [overall] median returns and within sub groups) are based on 
individual companies’ median values overall and under all sub groups. 
 
Table 5: CNX NIFTY [i.e., Nifty-50] companies classifications 
A. Overall 
 Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 50 26 24 
ROE 50 25 25 
CR 50 25 25 
B. Size 
B1. Size 1: Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 17 09 08 
ROE 17 09 08 
CR 17 09 08 
B2. Size 2: Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 11 06 05 
ROE 11 06 05 
CR 11 06 05 
B3. Size 3: Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 09 05 04 
ROE 09 05 04 
CR 09 05 04 
B4. Size 4: Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 13 07 06 
ROE 13 07 06 
CR 13 07 06 
C. Industry 
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C1. Automobiles: Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 05 03 02 
ROE 05 03 02 
CR 05 03 02 
C2. Banking & Investment 
Finance: 
Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 10 05 05 
ROE 10 05 05 
CR 10 05 05 
C3. Cement: Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 04 02 02 
ROE 04 02 02 
CR 04 02 02 
C4. Construction & 
Infrastructure: 
Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 03 02 01 
ROE 03 02 01 
CR 03 02 01 
C5. FMCG & Food & 
Beverages: 
Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 03 02 01 
ROE 03 02 01 
CR 03 02 01 
C6. Information Technology 
(IT): 
Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 05 03 02 
ROE 05 03 02 
CR 05 03 02 
C7. Metals: Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 03 02 01 
ROE 03 02 01 
CR 03 02 01 
C8. Mining: Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 03 02 01 
ROE 03 02 01 
CR 03 02 01 
C9. Oil & Gas: Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 05 03 02 
ROE 05 03 02 
CR 05 03 02 
C10. Paints: Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 01 Company’s median return is equal to Industry’s median as 
there is only 1 company ROE 01 
CR 01 
C11. Pharmaceuticals: Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 04 02 02 
ROE 04 02 02 
CR 04 02 02 
C12. Power: Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 03 02 01 
ROE 03 02 01 
CR 03 02 01 
C13. Telecom: Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 01 Company’s median return is equal to Industry’s median as 
there is only 1 company ROE 01 
CR 01 
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Table 5 shows the allocation of the CNX NIFTY companies (50 in total) above and below the 
target returns levels. There are 26 and 24, 25 and 25, and 25 and 25 companies both above and 
below the target under ROA, ROE and CR respectively. Companies whose median value equal 
to or exceed the target outcome (i.e., cross-sectional median values) have a classification of 1, 
i.e., above-target. Below- target companies have a classification of 2. Similarly there are 17, 11, 
9 and 13 companies as divided based on their respective asset size under Size 1-4, and all 50 
companies based on their Sector under 13 industry sub groups. Table 5 also shows the number of 
companies of different such sub groups under both above and below target returns. Generally, 
equal representation is found in all the sub groups.  
 
Table 6: Kendall’s correlations results (Overall) 
 Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 50 0.201 0.036 
ROE 50 0.073 0.041 
CR 50 0.400** 0.560** 
Kendall τ correlation coefficients between the standard deviation and the distance to median are shown for each 
zone, * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
Table 6 provides the Kendall’s correlations results for the 50 CNX NIFTY companies. The 
correlations are not significant above and below target (except CR). Results are also mixed. 
The Kendall’s coefficients for ROA is positive (in line with Hypothesis 2) and for ROE it is 
negative (rejects Hypothesis 2) in the correlation results between distance from target and 
standard deviation for above target outcomes. However, as they are insignificant at 5% level, 
these results can’t be conclusive. The CR result however accepts Hypothesis 2 for above target 
companies. Thus, it implies that Indian companies located above target levels in terms of ROA 
(insignificant but with positive sign [see Fiegenbaum, 1990]) (it implies may be true for few 
companies in the overall group) and CR significantly exhibit a risk-averse behavior. This also 
indicates that the Prospect Theory implications holds true for these companies. But, it is a 
limitation of study results in regard to ROA and ROE and open for future researchers to study on 
a bigger datasets.  
 
In regard to the relationship between distance from target and standard deviation for below target 
outcomes, this study finds that Indian companies located below target levels in terms of ROE and 
ROA (insignificant) are showing negative correlations. This doesn’t accept Hypothesis 1 for 
these companies. Thus, these results don’t tend to support the Prospect Theory and Bowman’s 
(1980) risk-return associations among the below-target level companies, and imply that the 
decision makers are not risk-seeking if they perceive themselves to be operating below the target. 
However, the CR of such companies contradicts significantly with the above results. It supports 
the above theoretical implications.  
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Table 7: Kendall’s Correlations Results (Size and Industry Groups) 
A. Size 
A1. Size 1: Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 17 0.333 0.182 
ROE 17 0.222 0.000 
CR 17 0.333 0.214 
A2. Size 2: Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 11 0.200 0.400 
ROE 11 0.200 0.600 
CR 11 0.600 0.800 
A3. Size 3: Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 09 0.200 0.333 
ROE 09 0.400 0.667 
CR 09 0.200 1.000* 
A4. Size 4: Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 13 0.048 0.200 
ROE 13 0.905** 0.200 
CR 13 0.333 0.467 
B. Industry 
B1. Automobiles: Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 05 0.333 1.000** 
ROE 05 0.333 1.000** 
CR 05 0.333 1.000** 
B2. Banking & Investment 
Finance: 
Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 10 0.200 0.200 
ROE 10 0.800 0.400 
CR 10 0.600 0.400 
B3. Cement: Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 04 1.000** 1.000** 
ROE 04 1.000** 1.000** 
CR 04 1.000** 1.000** 
B4. Construction & 
Infrastructure: 
Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 03 1.000** NA# 
ROE 03 1.000** NA# 
CR 03 1.000** NA# 
B5. FMCG & Food & 
Beverages: 
Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 03 1.000** NA# 
ROE 03 1.000** NA# 
CR 03 1.000** NA# 
B6. Information 
Technology (IT): 
Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 05 1.000** 1.000** 
ROE 05 0.333 1.000** 
CR 05 0.333 1.000** 
B7. Metals: Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 03 1.000** NA# 
ROE 03 1.000** NA# 
CR 03 1.000** NA# 
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B8. Mining: Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 03 1.000** NA# 
ROE 03 1.000** NA# 
CR 03 1.000** NA# 
B9. Oil & Gas: Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 05 0.333 1.000** 
ROE 05 0.333 1.000** 
CR 05 0.333 1.000** 
B10. Paints: Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 01 Only 1 company. So, no question of above or below 
target one. ROE 01 
CR 01 
B11. Pharmaceuticals: Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 04 1.000** 1.000** 
ROE 04 1.000** 1.000** 
CR 04 1.000** 1.000** 
B12. Power: Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 03 1.000** NA# 
ROE 03 1.000** NA# 
CR 03 1.000** NA# 
B13. Telecom: Total 1-Above Target 2-Below Target 
ROA 01 Only 1 company. So, no question of above or below 
target one. ROE 01 
CR 01 
NA# Only 1 company, so no calculation is possible 
Kendall τ correlation coefficients between the standard deviation and the distance to median are shown for each 
zone, ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) and * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-
tailed) 
 
 
Table 7 provides Kendall’s correlations results for Size and Industry sub groups for the 50 CNX 
NIFTY companies. The results are also not consistent in different sub groups and contradictory 
in comparison to the overall results. For 17 Size 1 companies, it is found that the above target 
companies are not accepting Hypothesis 2, which implies that these companies are risk-seeking. 
Below target companies are however risk-averse, as Hypothesis 1 is rejected under ROA, ROE 
and CR. The above target Size 2 companies are also risk-averse, also both ROA and ROE of Size 
2 below target companies accept Hypothesis 1 which implies that they are risk-seeking. Results 
of Size 3 and 4 above target companies are also inconclusive in judging managers’ risk-seeking 
behavior as evidenced by insignificant negative ROA. However, in case of ROE of Size 4 
companies, the result is very significant. So, Hypothesis 2 is rejected mainly in Size 4 
companies. It implies that those above target companies’ managers are risk-seeking in nature. 
However, Size 3 below target companies’ CR results significantly reject Hypothesis 1 and 
thereby implies that the Prospect Theory implication that managers of below target companies 
are risk-seeking are not true for this set of Indian companies.   
 
In case of industry sub group companies, the automobiles, banking & investment finance and oil 
& gas above target companies show negative sign correlations in returns. However, these results 
are not significant. It may be implied that few of these industry sub-group companies are risk-
seeking in attitude (see Fiegenbaum, 1990). However, the CR of all these companies shows 
contradictory results. The below target companies under automobiles and oil & gas industry sub 
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groups significantly accept Hypothesis 1 on most of the selected parameters (except ROE in 
automobiles and ROA in oil & gas). This indicates their risk-seeking attitude. However, it is seen 
here that the below target companies under cement and IT (with significant positive 
correlations), and pharmaceuticals (except ROA) reject Hypothesis 1. Thus, all these companies 
are risk-averse in nature. The above target companies under cement (except ROA) and IT 
(significant in ROA) however accept Hypothesis 2 which also evidences their risk-averse nature. 
But, above target pharmaceuticals companies except ROA reject Hypothesis 2 which indicates 
their risk-seeking behavior. The above target construction & infrastructure companies have 
significant positive correlations under all measures which also show the presence of the Prospect 
Theory implications and risk-return paradox in their attitude. The results also show that FMCG 
& food & beverages (except CR), metals and mining (except ROE all are showing significant 
positive correlations) above target companies all accept Hypothesis 2 which is indicative of their 
managers’ risk-averse attitude. In case of power industry group also, all selected measures of 
above target companies reject Hypothesis 2. This is evident of their risk-seeking attitude.  
Thus, it can be concluded here that some (size-to-size and industry-to-industry basis) of the 
Nifty-50 Indian companies under both below and above target levels, show the presence of the 
Prospect Theory implications and Bowman’s (1980; 1982) risk-return paradox (see Table 8).    
             
 
Table 8: Summary of Risk Attitude Results 
Groups Above Target Below Target 
ROA ROE CR ROA ROE CR 
Overall Risk averse 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk seeking 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk averse 
(Significant) 
Risk seeking 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk averse 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk seeking 
(Significant) 
Size 1 Risk averse 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk averse 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk averse 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk averse 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk averse 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk averse 
(Inconclusive) 
Size 2 Risk averse 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk averse 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk averse 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk seeking 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk seeking 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk averse 
(Inconclusive) 
Size 3 Risk seeking 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk seeking 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk averse 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk averse 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk averse 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk averse 
(Significant) 
Size 4 Risk seeking 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk seeking 
(Significant) 
Risk averse 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk averse 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk averse 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk averse 
(Inconclusive) 
Automobiles Risk seeking 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk seeking 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk averse 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk seeking 
(Significant) 
Risk averse 
(Significant) 
Risk seeking 
(Significant) 
Banking & 
Investment 
Finance 
Risk seeking 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk seeking 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk averse 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk seeking 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk seeking 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk averse 
(Inconclusive) 
Cement Risk seeking 
(Significant) 
Risk averse 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk averse 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk averse 
(Significant) 
Risk averse 
(Significant) 
Risk averse 
(Significant) 
Construction 
& 
Infrastructure 
Risk averse 
(Significant) 
Risk averse 
(Significant) 
Risk averse 
(Significant) 
N/A N/A N/A 
FMCG & 
Food and 
Beverages 
Risk averse 
(Significant) 
Risk averse 
(Significant) 
Risk seeking 
(Significant) 
N/A N/A N/A 
Information 
Technology 
(IT) 
Risk averse 
(Significant) 
Risk averse 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk averse 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk averse 
(Significant) 
Risk averse 
(Significant) 
Risk averse 
(Significant) 
Metals Risk averse 
(Significant) 
Risk seeking 
(Significant) 
Risk averse 
(Significant) 
N/A N/A N/A 
Mining Risk averse Risk seeking Risk averse N/A N/A N/A 
AABFJ  |  Volume 11, no. 3, 2017 
 
122 
 
(Significant) (Significant) (Significant) 
Oil & Gas Risk seeking 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk seeking 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk averse 
(Inconclusive) 
Risk averse 
(Significant) 
Risk seeking 
(Significant) 
Risk seeking 
(Significant) 
Paints N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Pharmaceuticals Risk averse 
(Significant) 
Risk seeking 
(Significant) 
Risk seeking 
(Significant) 
Risk seeking 
(Significant) 
Risk averse 
(Significant) 
Risk averse 
(Significant) 
Power Risk seeking 
(Significant) 
Risk seeking 
(Significant) 
Risk seeking 
(Significant) 
N/A N/A N/A 
Telecom N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
4. Conclusion: 
 
This study is based on Bowman’s (1980; 1982) risk-return paradox. According to his findings 
efficient corporate managers can increase return (represented by ROA and ROE here) and reduce 
risk simultaneously. So, this is against the normal risk-return positive correlation concept. 
However, in light of the behavioural decisions of those corporate managers in regard to their 
risk-attitudes, a target return level or reference point is needed. This study has used the reference 
point in light of the Prospect Theory framework of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). It is 
hypothesized that firms and their managers above the target return level (i.e., the reference point, 
represented by group median returns) are risk-averse and they are risk-seeking when their 
companies are below that reference point.  
 
It is also a known fact that computation of ROA is done to find the efficiency and ability of the 
management to use companies’ assets. The ROE is a measure which the shareholders look at to 
judge whether a company and its managers are using their funds most effectively. The ROE is 
also dependent on the ROA of a company (under Du Pont Analysis). The ETA measure also 
points out the leverage position of the companies and risk-attitude of their managers. So, ROA 
and ROE are profitability measures and dependent on managerial decision-making abilities 
inclusive of risk attitude and ETA which itself is evidential of their risk approach. The model 
used in this study [i.e., Fishburn’s (1977) measure of risk and Kendall’s (1938) correlations] also 
finds out the decision-makers’ risk attitude being the representatives of their respective 
companies. 
 
In regard to returns (i.e., both ROA and ROE), Size 1 CNX NIFTY companies are the front-
runners in driving the overall results. However, their ROE returns are also most risky (higher SD 
value). If both risk and returns parameters are considered, Size 3 and 4 classified companies are 
laggards. However, in regard to the CR, it is found that Size 3 companies are more equity-heavy 
than their other counterparts. The CR is minimum for Size 4 companies which imply that big 
Indian companies are more dependent on debt capital which itself implies their risk-seeking 
attitude. The Industry groups’ results show that mining, IT, paints, FMCG & food & beverages 
and automobiles companies (all are showing above average ROA and ROE) are contributing 
most in overall returns of the CNX NIFTY companies. It is also evident that capital intensive 
industries like power, mining, etc. are more equity-prone than their metals, construction & 
infrastructure and banking & investment finance peers from the Nifty Index. 
 
Generally, the Kendall’s correlations are not significant above and below target (except CR) 
Nifty companies. However, this may be implied from the study results that Indian companies 
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located above target levels in terms of significant CR and ROA (through positive correlation 
coefficient sign) (see Fiegenbaum, 1990) exhibit a risk-averse behavior. It indicates that the 
Prospect Theory implications holds true for number of these companies.  
 
In regard to the relationship between distance from target and standard deviation for below target 
outcomes, this study finds that Indian companies located below target levels in terms of ROE and 
ROA are showing insignificant negative correlations coefficients. This doesn’t accept 
Hypothesis 1 for these companies. These results thereby doesn’t tend to support the Prospect 
Theory and Bowman’s (1980) risk-return associations among the below-target level companies, 
and imply that the decision makers are risk-averse if they perceive themselves to be operating 
below the target. However, the CR of such companies contradicts significantly with the above 
results.  
 
The results of Size and Industry sub groups for the 50 CNX NIFTY companies are also not 
consistent, rather contradictory in different sub groups and in comparison to the overall results. 
Size 1 and 2 above target companies are risk-seeking whereas Size 3 and 4 above target 
companies are mostly inconclusive in judging managers’ risk-seeking behaviour except in regard 
to ROE for Size 4 companies which only points out their risk-seeking attitude. In case of 
industry sub group companies, the automobiles, banking & investment finance and oil & gas 
above target companies show negative correlations in returns which doesn’t clearly imply that 
these companies are risk-seeking in attitude. However, the CR of all these companies shows 
contradictory results and is evidential of Prospect Theory implications in terms of risk-return 
paradox. It is also evident that the below target companies under cement and IT (with significant 
positive correlations) and pharmaceuticals (except ROA) and above target companies under 
cement (except ROA) and IT (significant in ROA) are risk-averse in nature. The above target 
construction & infrastructure companies have significant positive correlations under all measures 
which also show the presence of the Prospect Theory implications and risk-return paradox in 
their attitude. The results point out that FMCG & food & beverages (except CR), metals and 
mining (except ROE all are showing significant positive correlations) above target companies all 
are risk averse.    
 
So, it is quite obvious that determination of Indian managers’ risk-attitudes overall for the top 
Indian companies, size-wise and industry-wise from the Prospect Theory perspective do have 
implications for the current and prospective investors in these companies. From a practical 
perspective, the investors will be better prepared to monitor and predict the market performance 
of their stocks or prospective stock-investments if they understand that Indian managers may 
become less risk-averse (rather risk-prone) when they operate below-target and that this tendency 
increases as gain domains start to decline. If investors are aware of these relationships, their 
predictive stock selections will be more effective, thus ensuring more profitable investments in 
the future in the Nifty Index or industry-specific choices.  
 
Although this study is based on ex-post accounting data such as the ROA, ROE, etc. of the CNX 
NIFTY companies, but future studies can take into consideration market based measures to 
incorporate expectations or can use a questionnaire-based test approach to examine the Prospect 
Theory implications among these Indian companies. Also, many results are inconclusive (see 
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Table 8) which imply that future studies should undertake large indices from the Indian stock 
markets.     
 
However, the empirical findings under this study provide support for prospect theory 
applications in judging risk-return paradox and implied associations in between them as reported 
by many researchers throughout the world. This study also clearly indicates the risk-attitude of 
the top Indian companies’ managers in earning their returns. 
 
Note 1) The CNX Nifty is a well diversified 50 stock index accounting for 13 sectors of the 
economy. It is used for a variety of purposes such as benchmarking fund portfolios, index based 
derivatives and index funds (www.nseindia.com). 
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